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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
4 9 the
In People v. Wirtschafter,
Court of Appeals held a bail
bond taken in a criminal ease to be void as a statutory recognizance, where defendant's release was prohibited by statute. The
court followed the majority view '0 that where a bail bond is taken
without authority of law it cannot be enforced as a common law
obligation and a surety cannot be estopped from denying liability
for -voluntarily issuing it. Thus the surety escapes liability on
the bond.
The defendant in the instant case was released on bail pending
appeal of his second felony conviction, in contravention of the
applicable bail statute.5 1 He failed to appear and a forfeiture was
entered in 1945 and for some unstated reason again in 1951.
After the second judgment had been entered the surety moved to
vacate the forfeiture contending that the taking of bail, by the
.court, without
authority of law was void and therefore unenforceable.
The Appellate Division52 denied the motion to vacate the
forfeiture on a procedural point, indicating that the application
was one for remission of a forfeiture, and, not having been made
within one year, was untimely. a
The Court of Appeals negated the procedural difficulty
by
finding that the surety's motion was not one for remission after
forfeiture, but a challenge to the inherent power of a court to
declare void an act done by it without authority of law.
Judge Desmond, dissenting,5 4 felt that in the public interest,
the surety should be estopped from denying liability. His determination was founded on a previous New York case 5 which held
a surety unable to escape liability on a bond, where it had been
exacted from an athletic club without authority, by the Athletic
Commission for securing payment of the club's debts. Since the
insurance company received a premium for the bond and did not
condition its liability on the bond's valid issuance, it was estopped
from denying liability. Likewise in the instant case, a surety who
took a premum for writing the bond should get no benefit from a
judicial mistake of fact in accepting it. However the case on
which the dissent was based was distinguished by the majority

49. 305 N. Y. 515, 114 N. E. 2d 18 (1953).
50. See Note, 34 A. L. R. 609, 612.
51. CoDE Cal. PRoc. § 555 (2) and § 552.
52. People v. Wirtschafter,280 App. Div. 900, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 661 (2d Dep't 1952).
53. CoDE Cnme. Paoc. § 598.
54. Fuld, J., concurring.
55. McClare v. Massachusetts Bonding and insurance Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 195
N. E. 15 (1935).
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on the ground that in the prior ease there was reliance on the bond,
by an innocent third party plaintiff.
It appears that New York is now in accord with the generally
recognized principle that a bail bond or recognizance taken without authority is void and cannot be enforced against either principal or surety.
Violation of Condition of Probation
A probationer charged with violating a condition of his probation, is provided by statute"8 with an "opportunity to be heard",
before possible imposition of his original suspended sentence. The
fneaning of the phrase, in regard to the procedural safeguards it
affords a probation violater, was expressed for the first time by the
Court of Appeals in People v. Oskroba7 Both the majority and
dissent agree that the probationer should be provided with at
least a right to notice of the conditions allegedly
violated, and an
58
opportunity to attack or deny the charge.
The disparity in the opinions relates to whether the safeguards provided were afforded probationer in the instant circumstances. At the hearing, defendant failed to refute the charge of
which he had been notified, but extraneous material concerning
violations not previously charged were admitted by witnesses.
Probationer's request for an adjournment to bring in a witness
to refute these accusations was denied. The majority found that
denial of the adjournment was a matter of discretion and as such
was not a denial of Oskroba's "opportunity to be heard". The
dissent believed that a failure to allow a probationer time to defend against new matter, brought out for the first time at the hearing was a denial of procedural due process.
It is unfortunate that the procedural safeguards provided by
the phrase were not more precisely defined. However, the general
procedural requirements of notice and an opportunity to attack
the charge, give the probationer a fair degree of protection, and
provide the lower courts with an adequate guide to follow in
future determinations.
56. CODE CRrn. PROC. § 935 provides: "Whenever within the period of probation
any probationer shall violate his probatinn, the court may issue a warrant for his
arrest and may commit him without baiL On his being arraigned and after an opportunity to be heard the court may revoke, continue or modify his probation. If revoked,
the court may impose any sentence it may have originally imposed."
57. 305 N. Y. 113, 111 N. E. 2d 235 (1953).
58. See People ex rel Benacquista v. Blanchard, 267 App. Div. 663, 48 N. Y. S.

2d 22 (3d Dep't 1944) ; People v. Hill, 164 Misc. 370, 300 N. Y. Supp. 532 (Co. Ct.
1937).
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